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Market, Government, and
Israel1s Muted Baby Boom
ABSTRACT
Cohorts born in Israel since the late 1910swere approximately 70
percent larger than earlier cohorts. This brought aboutchanges in the
age structure that are even more dramatic than the Americanbaby boom.
This paper follows the impact of thelarge cohorts on the school
system and on the labor market, emphasizing the roleplayed by the
public sector.
In terms of the number of teachingposts the school system
demonstrated on the whole a veryprompt ability to adjust to the
pressure of high number of pupils. However,as rates of growth of
pupils decelerated, inputs in the schoolsystem failed to adujst down.
As a result, when the larger cohortsmoved up the educational scale,
the combination of rapid adjustment wherethey arrived and sluggish
adjustment imparted an upward pressure to theaggregate expenditure on
education.
When the large cohorts arrived atthe age of entry into the labor
force the impact was delayed and mutedby a rapid expansion of the
army and of the universities. Relative earnings cfthe young men 18_211
declined sharply during the decade. Theearnings of the very young
seem to be responsive to the relative sizeof a broader age group









* MARKET,GOVERNMENT, AND ISRAEL'S MUTED BABY BOOM
Rapid changes arouse curiosity, and thispaper is motivated by such
curiosity. There is a great deal of
variety in the rapid changes that we
observe —incohort size, age distribution,entry of women into the labor
market, the level of education, ethnic
composition, etc. Some of these
changes are exogenous to the
contemporary economic, demographic or social
scene, some may result from other changes;
some are expected and some come
as a surprise.
Generally, a problem is defined anda research program is designed
around endogenous variables. Inseeking explanations for a phenomenonwe
construct hypotheses, propose theories,or speculate about its causes
which either predisposeone towards specific independentvariables or
impose a preselection of such variables.It is less clear how to charta
research project around anexogenous change: here is an exogenousvariable
which may affect everything (ornothing) under the sun. If itappears in
many equations, what are we after?
One argument in favor offocusing on large—scale changes isthat they
may generate sufficiently robust findingsthat wIll show up even if the
analysis fails to take many other
variables into account, so thatthey
provide more dramatic experiments for
dealing with conventional questions.
Another is that rapid changes
can reveal different aspects ofsocial and
economic systems from thosewe learn about in the normalcourse of events,
i.e., they invite different
types of questions. What we ask andwhat we2
hope to learn has to do withthe adaptability of society to rapid changes:
the assessment of the capacity toabsorb shocks, and the identificationof
bottlenecks and rigidities. This is a questionof dynamics; the emphasis
is not on a particular variable but onthe phenomenon of rapid change. Now
it also makes sense to comparedifferent cases of rapid change and waysof
adjusting to them. While the exogenousshocks may stem from diverse
causes, the sets of protagonistsand the relevant bottlenecks in each case
may have much in common.
Several studies have examined the specificeffect of cohort size on
wages and unemployment (Welch,1979; Freeman, 1979; and Wachter, 1976).
Detailed documentation and arguments for theU.S. presented by Easterlin
(1980) and Russell (1982) trace the historyand discuss the consequences
of the American baby boom. Easterlin (1980)and Jones (1980) focus on the
unique experience of the baby boom generation.Louise Russel (1982) argues
that on the whole the baby boom was not a very importantphenomenon her
judgement relates not to the presence orabsence of partial effects but to
the robustness or dominance of the phenomenon.
Israel experienced a baby boom in the 1950s.In view of the keen
interest in the American baby boom, onewonders whether the Israeli
version had any effect. The sources of theIsraeli baby boom were analyzed
by Friedlander (1975). The potential significanceof the rapid change in
age structure was pointed out by Kop(1980).
I. THE BOOM
The Jewish population of Israel is based on immigrants,most of whom3
arrived in the past century. Immigration occurred in waves, inducing
uneven growth in the total population. The single most significant wave
occurred in 1948—51 when the population doubled. Subsequent immigration
rates fluctuated, but were much lower; between 1951 and 1973 the Jewish
population grew at 3.8 percent annually, of which immigration directly
contributed 47 percent. Between 1974 and 1980 the populationgrew at an
annual rate of 2.1 percent, the migration balance contributing only 20
percent.
Looking at the age structure of the population in 1955 we see that
the age group 0—4 numbered 214 thousand, while theage group 10—14, i.e.,
those aged 0—4 in 1945, numbered only 122 thousand (Figure 1 and Table
A—i). Obviously, the jump in the size of cohorts is translated to big
spurts in the rate of increase over time of particular age groups (see
Table 1). The dramatic change was brought about by a combination of the
large and concentrated immigration, the higher fertility of immigrants,a
baby boom among immigrants (Friedlander, 1975), and perhaps somemaking up
of births delayed abroad prior to immigration (Ben—Porath, 1980).
Most of the Jewish population in Palestine before 1948was of
European origin (EA); only approximately one tenth originated from the
Arab countries of the Middle East (AA: Asia—Africa). Massimmigration was
more equally divided between these two groups. AA women bore farmore
children than EA women —in1951 total fertilitjr of AA women was 6.31
while that of EA women was 3.16 and that of Israel—bornwomen was 3.56.1
To these compositional differences there was addeda baby boom within the
migrant population. The figures on age structure in 1950 for theEuropean
born (not shown) indicate a deficiency in the size of the 5—19age group
(i.e., those born in 1931—1945); the largest deficiency is forpeople born4
in 1941—1945, which partly reflects the effectof the war and the
holocaust on births and the creation and resumptionof family life after
the war.2
The subsequent changes in cohort size are aresult of reduced
immigration and fertility, and an echoof the first boom.
The crude birth rate declined sharply in the 1950s,increased between
1965 and 1975, and declined again from 1975 to 1980 (Table2). The decline
in the 1950s was largely a result of the steepdecline in age—specific
fertility coupled with a sharp drop in theshare of women of the main
childbearing age (20—34) in the population. These outweighedthe change in
the composition of women by continent of origin which, byitself, should
have raised fertility: because of the compositionof immigration, the
share of women from AA among women of peak childbearing age,which must
have been less than 10 percent before 1948, rose to 22 percentin 1950, 35
percent in 1955, and 43 percent in 1960.This is only part of the story.
The decline in age—specific fertility rates continued throughoutthe
period, mostly among the immigrants from Asiaand Africa whose fertility
converged down towards the levels of the European immigrants;only in
recent periods was there a decline also among the latter.Between 1965 and
1975 we observe the echo of the original baby boom. The numberof women
aged 20—34 rose from 215 thousand in 1965 to 347thousand in 1975, an
increase of 60 percent, while the total population of women rose by only
30 percent. Children aged 0—4 increased in this period by 39 percent.
There has been a trend towards postponed marriages which accounted
for some of the decline in age—specific fertility rates. The marked
decline in the proportion married between 1965 and 1970, coupled with a
sharp narrowing of age differentials between brides and grooms,reflect5
the coming of age of large cohorts of nubile women with some scarcity in
the older male cohorts. Ben Moshe (1983) has found that the marriage
squeeze brought about a decline in the age—specific marriage rates of
women and an increase in the marriage rates of men.
II. THE SCHOOL SYSTEM
The relevant age group for elementary school is roughly 5—14. and theone
relevant for high school is roughly 14—17. The evolution of these groups'
sizes is as follows:
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Friedlander (1975) has demonstrated the effect
baby boom on Israel's school system by citing
children aged exactly 6 (in thousands): 1947 —
45.0;1962 —47.2.During the 1950s the proportion of pupils out of this
rapidly growing population increased steeply, converging towards full
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of massimmigration and the
the absolute number of
01.5; 1952 —31.1;1957 —6
14—17 the proportion enrolled in schools rose from 43 percentin 1952 to
60 percent in 1960, fluctuated for several years whenthe population grew
at peak rates, and then resumed its growth in themid—1960s to reach 80
percent in 1980. (Note that elementaryeducation has been free and
compulsory in Israel since 1949; secondary—schoolingis free since 1978).
The most amazing thing occurred right at the start. There were125
thousand pupils in the Hebrew educational system (excluding higher
education) in 1948/9. In 1951/2 the number reached 284 thousand, an
increase of 126 percent (or an annual rate of increase of 31.3 percent).
At the same time, the number of teachers' posts increased by123 percent,
so that the average number of pupils per teaching—post hardlychanged!
This, in a country whose total population had doubled, and wherethe
immigrant population was illiterate —atbest in the language of the
country and often illiterate in general —orhad relatively low levels of
schooling. The increased supply of teachers therefore had to comefrom the
absorbing population. It is a well—known fact that this rapid expansion
took its toll in terms of a deterioration in teachers' qualifications; it
is, in fact, remarkable that the response in quantities was so close to
perfect and that all the pressures translated into quality reduction.It
would have been reasonable to suppose that the quality—quantity tradeoff
would be more evenly balanced: a higher teaching load borne by few, but
better qualified teachers. We get a similar picture in the U.S. baby boom
where certification standards of teachers were lowered, and the student!
teacher ratio reflected only small pressures (Russell, 1982), p. 30.
Let us now examine this response in greater detail. The wave of
increase 1948/9—1951/2 affected elementary and secondary schools more—or—
less to the same degree, with very little change in the student/teaching—7
post ratio (Table 3). In the following years the number of elementary—
school pupils kept rising, though at a decreasing rate, until around
1964/5. During this period of rapid growth, which also included theentry
of the baby—boom cohorts, the number of teaching—posts and classrooms
increased proportionately with practically no change in the student!
teacher/classes ratios. During the next 12years of stability (or some
decline) in the number of pupils —1964—76-,thenumber of teaching—posts
kept rising, sharply reducing the ratio of pupils to teaching—posts. This
reduction continued when the growth of the student populationresumed in
1976—82, the echo of the first baby boom.
The growth of the student population insecondary schools also
decelerated gradually, but was nonetheless quitehigh throughout the
period. In the l950s a significant part of this growthwas caused by the
increase in the rate of school enrolmentamong teenagers (secondary—school
enrolment rates for the 14—17 agegroup rose from 23.4 to 1952 to 46.5 in
1959). This is the only period in which thepressure of students was not
met by a proportional increase in teachers and classrooms(Table 3). The
early l960s marked the arrival of the large cohorts tosecondary school
age. The age group 14—17 increased from 107 thousand in 1959 to 200
thousand in 1965. These new cohorts also differedby origin —ahigher
fraction of Asia—Africa origin. For thesecondary school system this
growth meant several years in which school enrolment remainedfairly
stable, probably due to the change in the composition ofthe teenage
population by origin rather than a supply constrainton the part of the
system itself. The figures in Table 3 show that theslightly higher rate
of increase of students in this period(compared to 1952—59) was matched
by an increase in both teachers and classrooms. Whencohort size and8
composition stabilized, the increasein enrolment rates was renewed (46.1
in 1964, 64.4 in 1979), which meantthat inputs (teachers, classrooms)
rose faster than students, improvingthe relevant input ratios.
It is probably no accident that areform that broke down the two—tier
system of 8 years of elementaryand 4 years of secondary school into a6—
3—3 system was introduced in thelate 1960s after the pressures exerted by
the growing number of pupils hadsubsided.
Going back in time, we have to tracewhat happened to teenage
employment. In the late 1950s approximatelytwo fifths of the boys and one
third of the girls aged 14—17 were inthe labor force. This meant leaving
school early and starting work, to be interruptedat age 18 by army
service for 2 to 3 years, and then returningto the labor market. The rate
of labor force participation of the 14—17 age groupwas on the decline
between 1955 and 1960. In 1959 the growthof the 14—17 age group began
accelerating and, as noted, this influx wasassociated with a change in
composition by origin and with a temporaryhalt in the increase in school
enrolment. It was also associated with ahalt in the declining trend of
teenagers' labor force participation. Between1960 and 1965 the number of
teenage workers doubled and their proportionin the labor force increased
from 3.2 to 5.6 for boys, and from 6.3 to 9.7for girls. Still, the rate
of unemployment of the group did not increasein response to this influx.
1967 was the trough of a depression and teenage unemploymentreached 30.4
percent (whereas the normal levelbefore that was 12—14 percent), the size
of the group stabilized, and the rate of laborforce participation resumed
its rapid decline: teenage employment graduallydisappeared (less than 2
percent of employment in 1980).9
III. ON THE REACTION OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
The above discussion indicates that in terms of the roughphysical
indicators there has been a very responsive accomodation of thechange in
cohort size by the public sector. There was one period in whichpressure
was felt in the secondary schools, and there was also an improvement in
quantitative standards when pressures subsided. Of course, thequality
aspect is not discussed here; the deterioration in teachers' quality in
the period of undiscriminating recruitmentmay have affected the quality
of education received by children who went to school in the1950s.
There is no general accepted framework within which thereaction of
the public sector can be analyzed. Various models of thepublic sector can
be examined: (a) a bureaucratic machine that hassome quasi—firm responses
to changing prices or demand pressures, but also stickinessin certain
parameters (budgets or various indicators of performance); (b)a
benevolent maximizer of a perceived social welfare; (c)a political entity
intent on maximizing support or moved byself—seeking politicians and
bureaucrats. For any particular governmentresponse, one could find a
rationale in more than one view.
Large—scale demographic changes cause large changes in thenumber of
clients the government serves: in schools (in thecase of the baby boom),
in health services (for the elderly), etc. Suchpressures can be expected
to lead to a deterioration of services fora variety of reasons: a quasi—
firm argument is based on upward sloping (andperhaps short—run) inelastic
supply curves of the factors used to provide the services. Abureaucratic
argument is based on short term stickiness of budget allocationswhich10
would impart an elasticity of —1 to the curverelating expenditure per
client to the number of clients. From a staticpolitical—economy point of
view, if rapid pressures sharply increase
the marginal cost of satisfying
a particular group of supporters,there is an argument to seek the support
of others. A benevolent government, too,would shift the distribution of
its efforts in response to changes in relativecosts. There are therefore
plenty of reasons to expect a short rundownward sloping curve relating
government services per client tothe number of clients.
What if the government copes swiftly with certain aspectsof crises
and shocks with little or no decline in thelevel of services, i.e., has a
short term elastic curve relating expenditures or performanceto clients?
This may reflect some bureaucratic or public attachmentto certain
parameters, it may reflect realsocial priorities of a benevolent
government, or it may reflect a political systemwhich has a built—in bias
towards handling crises. We can describe the political processin the
following terms: governments seek support, whichis presumed to depend on
government actions. The support of most peopleis quite inert in the short
run, and unresponsive to governmentactivities in many fields, including
thinly spread changes in taxation or the qualityof services (see Olson,
1982; and Peltzman, 1976). However, at different timescertain topics can
become political issues, i.e., the way in which the governmenthandles a
problem will significantly affect the support it gets.This may be so
either because the topic is high on the minds of the public at large, or
because a particular group in the population will sway its supportbased
solely on the way a specific issue is resolved. The issues morelikely to
get government response are those where the groupof beneficiaries is well
defined while th cost is spread out thin, because of the inert reaction11
described above. Obviously, there are advantages togovernment
expenditures that have a public good property so that they satisfynore
than one group. Particularly notable is theconvergence of interests of
clients of services and their suppliers.
Demographic structure and changes fit well into such a framework. For
example, the elderly are likely to be highly responsive to how the
government treats them because of their relatively high dependenceon
government support, which should afford them some protectionagainst the
adverse effects of their size. Shocks of the sort discussedhere are a
natural source of issues. By definition, theycreate problems relating
directly or indirectly to well—defined groups in thepopulation. (Often
there is also an interested party ofgovernment employees.) The problems
associated with a rapidly growing groupmay become an issue over which
that group's support could easilysway, depending on government action.
This may make the government's short run 'demand curve'more elastic,
i.e., itwillmake an extra effort to minimize the reduction inthe
servicesthat it provides. In fact, there are indicationshere that such a
mechanism may make the government overlyresponsive to major challenges,
under the supposition that politically—inducedrapid adjustment entails
neglectof other, less dramatic issues that thegovernment is supposed to
take care of, neglect of less visibleaspects of the problem, etc.
The same rationale carries over to the role ofgovernment as an
employer. When young menorlarge numbers of women flood the labor market
and the government steps in to employthem, this too is open to
interpretation on several levels: (a) as theresponse of a quasi—firm
moving along a downward SloT)iflg demand curve for the factorsit uses to
produceservices for the population; (b) as theresponse of a bureaucracy12
intent on keeping a claim to certain budgetaryallocation slanting demand
towards unitary elasticity; (c) as the political concernof a government
with the ramifications of sharp declines in relativeincomes or the
emergence of unemployment in groupsthat it is concerned about, providing
some kind of employment/income insurance throughits functions as an
employer. This ties in with our earlier comment onthe double—barreled
effect of expenditures that both serve clients and provide government
employment. Certainly the most dedicated opponentsof cuts in social
budgets include social workers, and the staunchest(if not always
successful) defenders of budgets for research and higher learning are
university professors.
What happens when the tide ebbs? Is there symmetry in thereaction?
Or should we expect the level of services to continue toincrease after
the number of clients has declined (or growth has levelled off)?The
quasi—firm argument probably says yes. The initial pressure onspecific
factors supplying the services may create lagged supply response shifting
relative costs in favor of improvements in areas previously under
pressure. Bureaucratic arguments would predictthe same —budgets
eventually respond to pressures and are certainly downward sticky.The
political argument works in the same direction: where government
employment was rapidly created to meet the growth in demand,the group of
suppliers has been strengthened. This asymmetry in the response to rising
and falling needs imparts an upward bias to public sector expenditures.
The figures on national expenditure on education are consistent with our
conjecture (Table 4): the shares of the different levels changein
response to changing pressures, but this is done by upward pressureon
total expenditure, accompanied by an increased share of GNP allocated to13
education. Ofer (1983) has shown how the real expenditure per student in
elementary and secondary education related to per capita GNP rose from
12.9 percent in 1962 to 19.3 in 1978. His figures for the post—secondary
level show a slight decline in expenditure per student (deflated by GNP
per capita) when the system expanded (from 66.0 to 62.7 between 1962 and
1972, respectively), and a sharp increase afterwards (it reached 73.7 in
1978). As we shall see below, the higher education system also reacted
swiftly to the increase in its clientelle.
In the case of the education system, the employment aspect of an
expansion in this system should be discussed in conjunction with the
increase in women's labor force participation. The tremendous increase in
women's participation, particularly through the 1970s, could be viewedas
a quasi—shock in its own right (see Ben—Porath, 1983). But unlike the
changes in cohort size, there is some ambiguity in ascribing this shock to
purely exogenous causes. One hypothesis is that what we observe is largely
a long—term increase in demand that encouraged women's investment in
schooling, stimulated their entry into the labor force, and led to
associated changes in family—planning strategy. Alternatively, one could
place the responsibility on various supply—side factors —schooling,
attitudes, etc. There may also have been some sort of an income effect
from the direction of young men, which would fit in with the decline in
fertility observed in the late 1970s, and be consistent with Easterlin's
interpretation (1980). Either way, the gestation period of schoolingmay
create excess supply in the short run.
The government certainly played a major role inexpanding the
opportunities for higher education by financing a large fraction of the
growth of that system. More to the point here, is its role on the demand14
side: the public sector is the major employer of women, and employs a
large fraction of the growth of women in the labor force. This was
accomplished partly by expanding of employment in public services and
partly by substitution of men. The public sector had a fairly elastic
demand curve and was thus ready to provide employment to the women whom it
helped educate. The growth of employment in the public sector occurred at
a time when it is more naturally interpreted as a response to supply than
to demand phenomena (see Klinov, 1983).
The school system is an important element here. There has been a
strong feminization of the teaching profession, demonstrated in the
following figures: women's share in teachers' posts rose from 52.5 percent
in 1948/9, 58.3 percent in 1959/60, 63.7 percent in 1969/70 to 73.9
percent in 1981/2. The decline in the student/teacher ratio, noted above,
occurred when the student population had stopped growing (in elementary
and secondary schools), and while more and more educated women were
entering the labor market. These are probably connected. There is no
operational difference between the view that the government reacted to the
increased supply of women as a quasi—firm, with a fairly elastic demand
curve, and with the hypothesis that this elastic demand curve wasdesigned
to protect the level of employment and relative wages of an important part
of. the population.
A similar phenomenon occurred in another sphere of demographic
change: the increase in the number of the elderly. Here are the rates of
growth of the old—age support per recipient provided by Israel's National
Insurance Institute, and of the number of recipients:15









1960—1966 10.1 —1.4 8.5
1966—1977 8.4 5.8 14.9
1977—1979 3.6 5.2 6.2
1979—1982 2.2 12.4 16.6
Source: National Insurance Institute, Statistical Abstract, variousyears.
National Insurance Institute, Quarterly Statistics, various
issues.
This is, however, a tentative picture and should be studied further.
Another case from a different field has to do with defenseexpenditure.
Berglas (1983), who analyzed the evolution of defense expenditure in
Israel, noted a step function marked by a series of wars. While the
increases may have been inevitable, the absence of downwardadjustment is
part of the same asymmetry.
IV.ENTRYINTO ADULT ACTIVITIES
The baby boom of the l950s had a dramatic effecton the age structure of
the adult population in the 1970s. This can beappreciated by comparing
the Israeli figures with those describing the Americanbaby boom:16
Ratio of Age Group 15—29 to Age Group 30—64
1960 1970 1975
Israel 54.5 76.5 85.3
U.S. (Easterlin, 1980) 50.2 66.3 74.0
Adult activities consist of work and higher education, generally following
army service.
This section refers mainly to the male population. For some general
background on the role of age changes and participation ratesconsult
Table A—2 and A—3 which show (a) that the ratio of employed persons to the
population aged 14+ has been on the decline since 1955, but more
emphatically so in 1965—75 and (b) that this was due to the change that
occurred in age structure, mostly in the period 1960—70, and to
significant reductions in labor participation in 1965—75. The main trends
of the employment history of young men are presented in Table 5 and Figure
2. The participation rate of the 18—24 age group dropped in three steps:
from 1966 to 1967, from 1968 to 1970, and from 1973 to 1974. Over the
whole period 1965—75 the drop was from 52.6 to 34.9 percent, a truly
remarkable change for such a short period. The result was that in spite of
a 66 percent increase in the mean population aged 18—24 the number
employed rose only moderately from 1965 to 1973, and in 1980 was more or
less equal to what it was fifteen years earlier.
The most rapid increase in the size of the 25—29 age group occurred
between 1970 and 1975. Our data allow us to observe only the group aged17
25—34 where we see a significant decline inparticipation (4.9 p.p.), more
pronounced than before 1970 or after 1975, The annual data show thatthe
decline occurred between 1968 and 1975 (7.8 p.p.). Thiswas against a
background of some, but milder decline in participation of oldermen.
Thus, the major part of the story of the demographic shockis that
entry into the labor market was delayed. The army playedan important role
here. Military service is compulsory and universal forboth men and women
(though exemptions are granted, mainly towomen, on religious grounds).
There is also a career army, andmany conscripts sign up for an extended
term of duty before going on to work or study, Thisis clearly a powerful
instrument with which the public sector can affect theimpact of changing
cohort size on the rest of the system. Two of thesharp declines in the
participation rate of the 18—24 group coincide with thewars fought in
1967 and 1973, both of which were followedby increase in the size of the
army. While we have no reliable estimates, there is a basis forarguing
that a significant portion of the delayoccurred through army service.
Obviously, the shift in demand by the militarywas autonomous; the ability
to satisfy this demand was, however,certainly enhanced by the demographic
context.
The other obvious route to consider isschooling, The universities
grew most rapidly in the late 1960s and early l97Os (in1965—75 the number
of students almost tripled). The share ofstudents in the population aged
20—29 increased sharply from 1964/5 to1972/3, and declined slightly after
1974/5. For the 20—24 agegroup, most of the increase in the enrolment
rate occurred between 1965 and 1969, while forthe age group 25—29 it
continued until 1972/3. The expansionwas strongly reflected in resource
allocation: as already indicated, 12.9percent of the national expenditure18
were allocated to post—secondaryand higher education in 1962, 16.4
percent in 1965, peaking in1975 at 25.1 percent, and then slowly
declining (Table 4). During the periodof highest pressure the ratio of
students to academic staff did not deteriorate,and as the number of
students stablized the academic staffincreased further (Table 6). As in
the case of the lower educational levels,the impact was absorbed with an
elastic response, and improvement occurredafter the pressure subsided,
when inputs continued their growth.
It should be noted that the activitiesdescribed here may have not
exhausted the adjustment. Thus, we know thatthere was an increase in
emigration after the 1973 war (Lamdany,1983). It may well be that
extended periods of absence from the countrybeforeentering the labor
market or university served as a buffer.
In the U.S. between 1960 and 1970 the sizeof the age group 16—19
increased by 44 percent, the number of employedincreased by 11 percent;
the age group 20—24 increased by 49 percentand employment by 26 percent.
The educational system absorbed much of the excess,but the armed forces
were also a significant factor (seeOffice of Science and Technology,
1983, pp. 50—51).
V. CONTEXT
Before we explore whether the baby boom had any impact onthe labor
market, we have to clarify the demographic andeconomic context in which
the change took place.19
Immigration: We have already noted the large and fluctuating waves of
immigration. In Table 7 we break down the sources of growth in the
population of Jewish men aged 20—64. We see how the contribution of the
young, both Israel—born and foreign—born (lines 4 and 5), to the growth of
the adult population rises abruptly between 1965 and 1970, while net
immigration falls steeply and the more mature foreign—born grow older. The
contribution of the Israel—born to the adult population increases over
time and becomes dominant in the 1970s. The foreign—born contribution
occurs first through immigration, then the weight shifts to the maturation
of the foreign—born young, reaching a peak in 1965—70 when the foreign—
born baby boom generation comes in. But at the same time growing numbers
exit from the 20—64 category, so that in the 1970s the process of
maturation of the foreign—born contributes negatively to the growth of the
adult population: as net immigration slows down in the late 1970s, the
foreign—born reduce rather than increase the adult population, offsetting
part of the very high increase in the Israeli—born. The successive 5 years
of growth of the 20—64 age group are less volatile than the rates of
change for the total population.
The context of large and changing immigration has broader
implications. It means that the system is accustomed to shocks, that the
public sector has always had to rapidly alter the level of services that
it provides, and that the way it copes with the variety of social issues
raised by immigration was a primary criterion by which it was judged.
Women: In assessing the impact on the labor force of the entry of larger
cohorts of young persons it is important to note that at the same time
there has been a change in women's employment.20
As in many other countries, the period under review was oneof
significant increase in the labor force participationof women. When we
examine men alone, the share of men aged 18—34 in the changeof all
employed men rises sharply after 1965, from approximately1/7 to between
2/3 and 1.0 (Table 8 line 1). For both sexes the change is quite sharp
(line 3) after 1965, but more moderate than for menalone because in the
case of women there was significant increase inthe number of women aged
25—44. Because of the jump from 1/3 to 2/3 in the share of women inthe
increase in employment after 1965 (line 5), the contributionof young men
to the change in overall employment rises much more moderatelythan their
contribution to the rise in men's employment (line 6). We see in Table8
that while all women and young men contributed less than half of the net
increase in the change in employment before 1965, they contributed85—100
percent of the change in 1965—80. At the same timethe proportion of men
aged 35—54 in employment has declined.
Whether the influx of women aggravated or alleviated the position of
young men depends on whether they are substitutes or complementsin the
labor force. Do young men compete with young women? With all women? The
ratio of young men to young women and to all women decline dramatically
through the 1970s while the relative hourly earnings of young men and
young women did not change. As the difference in schoolingbetween men and
women both aged 25—34 in the labor force has not changed from 1970 to
1980, a high degree of substitution issuggested.5
Arabs from the occupied territories. A direct consequence of the 1967 war
was the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the entry of
Arab labor from these territories into the Israeli labor market,
increasing the supply of unskilled, manual labor. Again, this effect could21
go either way —theobvious substitution with unskilled domesticlabor, or
a complementary effect opening opportunities forlow—level supervisory and
middlemen positions for Jews. Amir (1981), whostudied the changing
returns to education, tends to argue that the effectwas positive, i.e.,
that the unskilled Arab labor improved theopportunities among Jews for
domestic low— and medium—schooling labor.
The macroeconomic picture. Israelexperienced a continuous period of
rapid economic growth until 1965. Thiswas interrupted by a deep recession
in 1965—67, with considerableunemployment. The young were hit
particularly hard —therate of unemployment of men aged 18—24rose from
10.7 in 1965 to 22.5 percent in1967, and for men aged 25—34 from 2.8to
7.8; the rate for men aged 45—54 rose from1.1 to 4.9. The combination of
continued slump and influx into the laborforce of the young workers could
have been disastrous. But,following the 1967 war the countryexperienced
a resumption of rapid growth until 1973. Thiscreated an environment that
certainly eased the entry of newyoung cohorts into the labor force.
Following the 1973 war and theenergy crisis Israel was gripped by
stagflation. With rising rates ofunemployment towards the end of the
decade. The deterioration in therelative position of theyoung in the
late l970s might reflect thischange.
When we examine the impacton the labor market of a
sudden change in cohort sizeour main concern is with the elasticitiesof
substitution which reflect the
uniqueness of particular types of labor.At
the same time, unemploymentrates are also of interest,particularly for
the identification of short—term
difficulties (see Welch, 1979,1983;22
Freeman, 1979; and Wachter, 1976). In addition, some groupstend to be
more sensitive than others to cyclical variations.
The delay in the entry of people aged 20—24 into thelabor force was
important enough in itself, but eventuallyit had its impact on the age
composition of the labor force once these peopledid enter it. In Table 5,
Part I, we see that from 1965 to 1970 the share of those aged20—24 in the
population increased by 4.7 percentage points (p.p.)while their share in
employment rose by only 1.3 p.p. In 1970—80, however,the change in the
population share of the 25—34 age group was 7.5 p.p.,and among the
employed it was 9.8 p.p.
As is well demonstrated in Table 9, the relative earnings of young
men declined sharply during the 1970s. The relative earningsof men aged
25—34 and women aged 18—24 declined more moderately. The relative earnings
of older people declined too (sharply for women). The relative numberof
men aged 18—24 did not increase and the relative numberof young women
actually declined sharply. It is the 25—34 group and older menwhose
numbers increased sharply during this period, which probably affected the
relative earnings of young men.
Obviously, we have a change in the profile of earnings. This hasbeen
confirmed in a comparative cross section study by Amir (1983) who
estimated earnings functions for 1970—72 and 1978—80 within education
categories and showed that the positive linear coefficient on experience
and negative coefficient on experience squared both increased in absolute
terms. The question is: what caused that change, and specifically, is it
related to the change in the size of the age groups.
The series of regression equations presented in Table 10 reveal the
following:23
First, the relative earnings of young cohorts are adversely affected
by increases in the general level of unemployment (represented by the rate
of unemployment of men aged 35—54).
Second, young men's relative earnings are adversely affected by
increases in their own share in total employment as well as by the
increases in the share of other groups —youngwomen and older men and
women. This indicates a fair amount of substitution between these groups.
Welch (1983), studying U.S. data, also found that the relative wages of
the young react to the proportion of the old. Indeed, fairly good results
are obtained when we run relative wages on the proportion of young people
of both sexes, and also the proportion in employment of the elderly (65+)
of both sexes. It is hard to separate out the effect of different
demographic groups when the variables appear simultaneously, but when they
appear separately, the reaction of the young men's relative earnings to
changes in the proportion of young women or older men are certainly no
smaller than to their own numbers.
Third, the age group 18—24 responds adversely to the size of the
whole group aged 18—34 rather than to its own size.
Fourth, the response of relative earnings of men aged 25—34 to
changes in its share in employment is somewhat weaker than that of the 18—
34 age group.
Similar results have been obtained when the dependent variable is
hourly rather than annual earnings and where instead of the ratios of the
age groups in employment we used as independent variables their ratios in
the labor force and (alternatively) in the population both as independent
variables and as instrumental variables (see regressions No. 4 and No. 11
in Table 10).24
The age group 18—24 seems to have suffered in relative terms notwhen
it was at its peak size but at the end of the decade, when it wassmaller
and when the whole 18—34 group was at peak size. This means thatthe
vanguard of the larger cohort (aged 18—24 in the beginningof the 1970s),
most of whom were the 25—34 category in 1980, sufferedmuch less than the
following (somewhat smaller) class that found the entry positionsin the
labor market crowded with the very large 25—34 cohort.
The data for the labor force extend over longer periods. For the
period1955—80 there is a significant negative correlation between the
employment rate of persons aged 18—34 (the ratio of employed to
population)and the share of that age group in the population. For the
period 1965—80 we can distinguish between age groups 18—24and 25—34,
finding large negative correlations for the latter. For the period1965—80
we find that the rate of unemployment of the 25—34 age group (relative to
age 35—54) is positively correlated with itsshare in the population and
in the labor force, and negatively related to its rate of labor force
participation. Several regressions show that the unemployment of the young
rises more in absolute terms and less in relative terms than the rate of
unemployment of men aged 35—54. In different variations it is also
positively associated with the relative weight of the young (18—34) and of
the old (65+) in the labor force (Table 11).
In principle, the change in the age structure could have affected
demand. Some indication of this is seen in the regressions where the
proportion of the population aged 20—29 has a significant effect on
investment in dwelling.6 But it is quite clear that the net effect is
supply effect.25
CONCLUS IONS
The entry of large cohorts into the labor market affected both relative
wages and unemployment. What merits attention is the larger role that the
government played in meeting the baby boom. This was demonstrated here by
following the evolution of the school system as it coped with the uneven
arrival of students at different levels. The entry of the large cohorts
into the labor market was delayed because of the expansion of the army,
another silent role of government. We presented some tentative ideas on
what could explain the behavior of the public sector, suggesting that
governments may be keen on responding quickly to big shocks, but unable to
adjust downward once the pressure subsides. Whatever the correct model, it
is important to unravel the role of the public sector and to pay more
attention to its behavior.2'
FOOTNOTES
*Thispaper was written whileI was visiting the National Bureau of
Economic Research and supported by a grantfrom the Mellon Foundation
to the NBER. I draw here on workwhich was done at the Falk Institute
as part of a project on theIsraeli economy after 1967, and also some
work I did while visiting the PopulationCouncil. N. Sicherman, Y.
Yacob,J. Lotan, and R. Sendek provided researchassistance and
programming at various stages of thiswork. I thank M. Eisenstaedt for
her valuable editing and Richard Freeman,Robert Gregory, Zvi
Griliches, Simon Kuznets and Ron Lee foruseful comments on an earlier
draft.
1. CBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982, p.95.
2. The 1950 figures for EA are: age 0—4, 27,400; age5—9, 11—242; age 10—
14, 18,095; age 15—19, 35,856; age 20—24,51,124. The 0—4 category does
not include children born to EA women after immigration.While the
figures are also affected by the selectivityof immigrants by age and
family status, the large 0—4 group relative tothe 5—9 group most
likely reflects the effect of the war.
3. The inertia may be a result of the infra—marginalcommitment because of
ideology or interests, or it may reflect lackof information and care.
See Olson (1982).
4. Within the 25—34 age group the weight of those aged25—29 changed in
the following manner: 1965 —51.0;1970 —53.0;1975 —61.7;1980 —
53.7.The change in weights by itself could account for participation
rates for the whoel group (92.0, 91.7, 90.8, 91.7),for the
corresponding years (assuming that the LFPR of men aged3034 was 97 in2.7
1965, and for men aged 25—29 —87).The sharp decline observed in 1970—
75 is thus not just a matter of weighting.
5. The expected hourly earnings using theearnings of men by schooling in
1980 were (only the ratio matters):
Men Women
25—3435—5425—3445—54







1970 11.6 11.0 12.3 11.0 11.5 0.94 1.0
1980 12.7 11.7 13.3 11.6 12.5 0.95 1.0
6. The dependent variable (DWELINV) is theratio of gross investment in
dwelling to the capital stock in dwelling, for theperiod 1951—82.
DWELINV =—2.6+0.22RGNPPC ÷ 0.69 IMMIC —0.58EMIG




RGNPPC —rateof growth of per capita GNP.
IMMIG —ratioof immigrants to Jewish population.
EMIG —ratioof temigrantsl to Jewishpopulation; 'emigrants' is the
difference between immigrants and thenet migration balance.


































































































































































































































































1965 '70 '75 '80
'80Table 1
The Jewish Population byAge Group:1950—1980
perce1t8gechange
19 50—55 - 1955—60 1960—65 1965—70i9ZpLJ27L.Q—
0—34 41.0 21.2 20.6 11.3 16.0 10.8
0-4 45.2 1.7 10.0 11.7 24.8 7.6
5—9 101.7 25.4 4.0 0.8 15.2 21.1
10—14 39.2 73.9 22.5 —1.0 0.0 11.7
15—19 26.7 18.1 72.4 12.5 0.3 —2.0
20—24 22.6 .3 19.4 58.1 17.5 —4.0
25—29 13.1 9.9 9.9 12.1 61.1 15.4
30—34 45.4 4.5 10.6 2.9 12.1 60.9
Source: Appendix TableA—i.Table 2
Changes in the Birth Rate of the Jewish
1955—60 1960—65 1965—70 1970—75 1975—80
1. Actual
change




—2.35 —1.07 —0.32 —0.29 —3.12
3. Agestructure
of wo.men 15—49
—0.80 —1.36 0.19 2.04 0.50




— 0.07. 0.97 —0.12 —0.46
5. Origin 1.84 1.20 0.20 0.14 0.44




— — 0.28 —0.43 —2.41
women
a The contribution of each variable to thechange in the birth rate from period t
to t+5 (B+5 —Bt,line 1) was calculated in the following manner:
B+5 is the predicted birth rate for t+5. if x were not to change from t to t+.
The contribution is B+5 —BtS.In this way, the interactions are included





and ClasseroOms in the HebrewEducation Syst
Teaching
Teaching
Year Posts Classrooms Students Posts Classrooms




1948/9 21.9 -- } 29.8 31.4
1951/2 21.2 294c
} 6.2 6.2 59c
1963/4 21.2 29.2
b
} —0.7 4.2 0.8
15.9


















103a 28,0a 67a 46a
Including new inteediate school(in a 6,3,3 system).
Excluding intermedidate schools,





Source: CBS, Statistical Abstracts, various years.33
Table4









1962/63 6.0 100.0 6.4 38.7 25.8
secondary
12.9
1964/65 6.7 100.0 6.8 36.3 27.3 13.6
1969/70 7.3 100.0 6.2 32.3 27.0 21.9
1974/75 8.3 100.0 7.3 31.3 26.4 24.2
1979/80 8.8 100.0 8.8
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract ofIsrael, 1982
p. 618.34
Table5
Men Aged 18—34, Population, Labor Force, and Employment
(Jewish Men)




38.4 35.2 32.9 36.7 39.2 41.0 18—34
18—24
— — 15.5 20.2 19.5 17.0
25—34
— — 17.4 16.5 19.7 24.0
Share in employment
37.8 34.6.31.3 33.3 36.2 39.9 18—34
18—24
— — 10.0 11.3 9.9 8.1
25—34
























. 7.3 4.6 5.5 5.3 4.1 6.8
18-24
— — 10.7 10.9 8.9 16.2
25—34
— 2.8 2.1 2.2 4.1






Percent growth of population
Total (14+) 17.0 24.5 14.6 15.4 9.3
18—34 7.5 16.2 28.0 23.2 14.6
18—24 49.2 11.4 —4.4
18—19 32.5 —5.8
20—24 11.1 20.3 58.1 16.2 —3.9
25—34 5.0 12.0 9.0 37.6 33.4
25—29 11.9 11.3 13.5 59.9 16.0
30—34 —1.6 12.9 4.5 12.9 61.7
Percent growth of labor force
Total (14+) 14.1 14.5 4.0 8.1 8.2
18—34 4.8 6.0 18.2 24.6 23.4
18—24 18.4 —7.0 —4.8
25-34 6.7 30.8 30.9
Share of age group in
net addition to employment
18—34 16.3 14.9 88.0 67.1 97,4
18—24 46.7 —6.1 —19.1
25—34 41.3 73.2 116.5
Source: All data are based on Labor Force Surveys except the breakdown forage 20—24 and 25—29, whicharefrom the population estinates7 and the date forage
18—19, which are the difference between 18—24 as in the Labor Force Statistics
and 20—24 in the population estimates.36
Table6
Students and Teachers in Academic Institutions




Bothsexes 3.8 6.3 71 7.2 6,8
Men 5.4 7.0 7.9 8.0 7.3
Women 2,8 5.6 6.2 6.3 6.4
Allstudents
in academic
institutions18,368 36,246 45,365 51.000 55,360
Academicstaff 2,628 5,977 7,681 8,281 9.680
Student/teacher
ratio 7.0 6.1 6.5 6.2 5.7
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts of Israel,
various years.37
Table 7






All 39.2 20.8 20.1 10.9 15.2 10.6
2.Total change
in percent:
20—64 28.5 15.9 16.0 13.0 16.4 9.6
3.Total change 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
4.Israel born 13.3 31.6 32.0 59.2 87.0 130.4
5.Foreign born:
maturing in
35.0 52.8 51.9 96.9 37.0 43.7
6.Foreign born:
maturing out
—12,6 —29.6 —38.0 —56.6 —51.6 —82.9
7.Net maturing 22.4 23.2 13.9 40.3 —14.6 —39.1
8. Net migration 64.3 45.2
and mortality
54.0 0.5 27.5 8.7
Line (4): Change in the Israeli—bornage 20—64.
(5): Foreign—born aged 15—19 at the beginning of eachperiod.
(6): Foreign—born aged 60—64 a the end of eachperiod.
(7):(5) —(6).
(8): 100.0 -(4)—(7).Table 8
Men and Women in the Growth of Employment
1955—60 1960—65 1965—70 1970—75 1975—80
(1)LYM 16.3 14.8 87.9 67.3 97.4
EM
(2)LYF 33.4 53.0 54.5 61.8 53.7
1EF
(3) IY(M+F) 2.0 29.0 66.5 64.0 68.8
E(M+F)
(4)tYF 52.0 68.0 53.6 56.4 51.0
Y(M+F)
(5)1EF 34.5 37.7 64.9 58.5 65.3
E (F+M)
(6) YM 10.6 9.2 30.8 27.9 33.7
E(F+M)
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975198
(7)AN 33.9 33.8 30.1.3 26.2
E(M+F)
M —Male,F —Female,Y —18—34,A —35—54,E —Employed.39
Table9
Young and Old Wage Earners' Relative to Age Group 35-64
Annual earnings No.of wage earners


























The data refer to all wage earners, Jews and Arabs. Theseare ratios
where the denominator refers to theage group 35-64.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Constant 1.620 1.650 -0.060 -0.097
7.53 6.8 0.2 0.3
Rateof employment of 0.598 0.602 0.838 0.847
men 35—54
11.0 1O''+ 10.5 10.5





D.W. 1.564 1.436 1.211 1.480
0.877 0.863 0.866 0.864























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PercentGrovth of Population andEmployment,1955—1980 (Jewish)




1. Population 17.03 214.53 1l.63 15.143 9.28
Aged 114+
2. Employment 18.014 20.014 3.89 9.20 6.141
Difference 1.01 _14.149 —iO.74 —6.23 —2.87
(2)-(1)
a. Age Structure —0.714 —5.05 3.72 0.70 1.63
b. Labor force —2.12 0.142 -7.0 —7.72 —2.63
participation
Rate
c. Unemployment 3.91 0.19 0.114 0.62 —1.85
Rate
Interaction between:
b andc 0.05 0.3k —0.11 0.19 —0.014
a, b, c —0.09 —0.39 —0.142 —0.02 —0.02
Increase
Pop aton 16.19 24.59 :5.143 17.76 IC.29
--. —Lric 2E.- 7.7C 25.6 22.3E
Difference 12.05 6.86 2.27 10.30
(2)-(1)
a. Age Structure —1.39 -14.87 0.95 0.55 0.O





band c _0.2L —0.11 —0.02 0.31






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Sources to Tables:
Central Bureau of Statistics, Labor Force Surveys
1955—61, Special Series 162; Jerusalem 19614, p. 7,Table 4.
1963,Special Series 176;. Jerusalem 1965, p. T,Table 1.
19614—66, Special Series 213; Jerusalem 1968, p. 12,Table 5.
1965—72, unpublished data received from the CBS.
1976, Special Series 5614 Jerusalem 1978, p.6.Table3.
1976, Special Series 5614; Jerusalem 1978, p. 8,Table 2.
1977, Special Series 611; Jerusalem 1979, p.6,Table3.
1978, Special Series 653;Jerusalem1981, p. 82, Table 3.
1980: Central Bureau of Statistics, jp4y BulletinLS
,Supp
Jerusalem, April 1981, pp. 66—67,Table4
PopulationFigures: Statistical Abstracts andFilesof the Central
Bureau of Statistics'12
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